The universe is not a set

“Being a set” is in fact a property of the universe. That’s because “set” is defined as “a collection of distinct objects”, and the universe is in fact a collection of distinct objects (and more). The definition of “set” correctly, if only partially, describes the structure of the universe, and nothing can be separated from its structure. Remove it from its structure, and it becomes indistinguishable as an object and inaccessible to coherent reference.

Because the universe fulfills the definitive criteria of the “set” concept (and more), it is at least in part a (structured) set. One may object that a “set”, being a concept or formal entity, cannot possibly describe the universe; after all, the universe is not a mere concept, but something objective to which concepts are attached as descriptive “tools”. But to the extent that concepts truly describe their arguments, they are properties thereof. The entire function of the formal entities used in science and mathematics is to describe, i.e. serve as descriptive properties of, the universe.

Everything discernable (directly perceptible) within the physical universe, including the universe itself (as a coherent singleton), can be directly mapped into the set concept; only thusly are secondary concepts endowed with physical content. One ends up with sets, and elements of sets, to which various otherwise-empty concepts are attached.

In search of counterexamples, one may be tempted to point to such things as time and process, “empty space”, various kinds of potential, forces, fields, waves, energy, causality, the spacetime manifold, quantum wave functions, “laws of nature”, “the mathematical structure of physical reality,” and so on as “non-material components of the universe”, but these are predicates whose physical relevance utterly depends on observation of the material content of the universe. To cut them loose from the elements of observational sets would be to deprive them of observational content and empty them of all physical meaning.

Source: http://scientopia.org/blogs/goodmath/2011/02/11/another-crank-comes-to-visit-the-cognitive-theoretic-model-of-the-universe/

The CTMU ignores the possibility of a multiverse

The CTMU’s use of the term “universe” corresponds to the following definition: the universe is all and only that which is real. Under multiverse theory, a “universe” is not equivalent to the CTMU’s usage. Furthermore, the CTMU would assert that any so-called “multiverse” actually fits the CTMU’s definition of universe. This is implied by the principle of syndiffeonesis, which says that if the difference between two things were real, they would both reduce to a common medium providing the metric of separation and would to that extent be similar.

 

The CTMU is unfalsifiable

Despite the fact that the CTMU makes empirical predictions (e.g. the accelerating expansion of the cosmos), it is not predicated on the observation of such phenomena. It is explicitly a logical theory from the start, relying on nothing but rational deduction. The CTMU is therefore not empirically falsifiable, but logically falsifiable. I.e., it can be falsified by showing that it contains errors or internal contradictions.

Nothingness cannot exist, therefore existence must exist.

This is a common counterargument to the CTMU’s requirement of self-determinism. The CTMU states that since any cause real enough to cause reality would already be included in reality, reality must be self-caused. But if reality does not need a cause to begin with, then obviously this argument is irrelevant. At first glance, the notion that existence must exist because “nothingness” cannot seems reasonable. If there is no alternative to existence, then how could existence not exist? However, this argument merely begs the question. The idea that nothingness cannot exist, therefore…  implies that something must exist. But this amounts to the assertion that existence must exist because existence must exist, which fails to explain “why it must”. This argument does not answer the question “why existence”?

The universe does not need a cause

The CTMU’s assertion that the universe is self-caused is often dismissed by the opposition as a mere assumption. After all, why can’t the universe simply exist ?  However, denying this premise leads to irreconcilable contradictions.

1. If the universe did not have a cause, then it would have no explanation for its existence.

2. If the universe were caused by nothingness, then it would have no explanation for its existence.

3. If the above two situations were distinguishable from one another, they would be different. In order to be different, there would need to be an explanation of their difference, which would require a cause of their difference. I.e., “what makes them different”?

4.  Therefore, there is no way to distinguish between the above two situations, and therefore no way to claim that something applies to one but not the other.

5. The universe cannot be caused by nothingness, because nothingness is by definition not something, and thus cannot ‘do’ anything.

Thus, the universe cannot be uncaused.